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Introduction 
A hundred years after tax concessions for charitable contributions were introduced as part 
of the personal income taxes that many countries enacted during the First World War, 
these countries continue to debate the appropriate level and structure of tax concessions 
for charitable gifts. In Australia, where the Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 (Cth) 
included a deduction for donations to ‘public charitable institutions’,1 recent reviews have 
considered replacing the deduction with tax rebates (or credits) or matching grants.2 In 
the United States, which introduced a charitable deduction in the War Revenue Act of 
1917,3 recent proposals include limiting the maximum marginal rate at which charitable 
                                                
1  Not-for-Profit Sector Tax Concession Working Group, Fairer, Simpler and More Effective Tax 
Concessions for the Not-for-Profit Sector: Discussion Paper (2012) 18. 
2 See, eg, ibid 22, 25–7; Productivity Commission, Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector: Research 
Report (2010) 168–84, app G. 
3 Pub L No 65-50. 
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contributions may be deducted,4 replacing the deduction with a credit,5 or converting the 
credit with a matching grant program.6 And in Canada, where a deduction for specific 
charitable contributions was included in the income tax introduced in 1917, 7  the 
deduction was converted into a non-refundable credit in 1988,8 while more recent 
reforms have encouraged gifts of capital assets by exempting certain gifts of property 
from tax on capital gains and increasing income-related ceilings on the amount that 
individual taxpayers may claim in respect of charitable gifts.9 
This chapter considers the tax treatment of charitable contributions in a personal income 
tax,. The next section reviews and evaluates alternative rationales for tax recognition of 
charitable gifts and the implications of these rationales for the form that tax recognition 
should take. The section titled ‘The Canadian Experience’ examines recent experience in 
                                                
4 As a revenue-raising provision, for example, President Obama has proposed limiting the tax benefit of 
various deductions and exclusions (including the charitable contributions deduction) to 28 per cent: 
Department of the Treasury (US), General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue 
Proposals (2012) 73–4. 
5  See, eg, Our Fiscal Security, Investing in America’s Economy: A Budget Blueprint for Economic 
Recovery and Fiscal Responsibility (2010) 32 (proposing that the charitable contributions deduction be 
replaced by a 25 per cent refundable credit). 
6 Pete Domenici and Alice Rivlin, Restoring America’s Future: Reviving the Economy, Cutting Spending 
and Debt, and Creating a Simple, Pro-Growth Tax System (Bipartisan Policy Centre, 2010) 33–4 
(proposing a 15 per cent refundable credit that would be paid directly to charitable organisations). 
7 Income War Tax Act, SC 1917, c 28, s 3(1)(c) (permitting a deduction for contributions to Patriotic and 
Canadian Red Cross Funds and other patriotic and war funds approved by the Minister). 
8 See David G Duff, ‘Charitable Contributions and the Personal Income Tax: Evaluating the Canadian 
Credit’ in Jim Phillips, Bruce Chapman and David Stevens (eds), Between State and Market: Essays on 
Charities Law and Policy in Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) 407. 
9 See, eg, Malcolm D Burrows, ‘Charitable Tax Incentives in Canada: Overview and Opportunities for 
Expansion’ (2009) 22 Philanthropist 3. 
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Canada, evaluating recent legislative reforms in light of the rationales discussed in the 
preceding section. 
Rationales for Tax Recognition and Implications for Tax Design 
In a recent article examining options for reforming the charitable deduction in the United 
States, Roger Colinvaux suggests that there are ‘two principal rationales’ for recognising 
charitable contributions in computing income tax payable by the donor — ‘that of base 
measurement and of subsidy.’10 The first of these rationales, he explains, is ‘foundational, 
in that it comes from first principles of an income tax.’11 The second depends on social or 
economic policy extrinsic to the definition of taxable income. The following sections 
explain and evaluate each of these rationales for the recognition of charitable 
contributions in a personal income tax, as well as their implications for the manner in 
which charitable contributions should be recognised for tax purposes.12 
Base Measurement 
The definition and measurement of the tax base for a personal income tax is a question of 
horizontal equity, a basic principle of tax fairness according to which taxpayers who are 
similarly situated should pay similar amounts of income tax. Although the concept of 
                                                
10 Roger Colinvaux, ‘Rationale and Changing the Charitable Deduction’ (2013) 138 Tax Notes 1453, 1453. 
11 Ibid 1455. 
12 This discussion is based on Duff, ‘Charitable Contributions and the Personal Income Tax’, above n 8, 
426–36 and David G Duff, ‘The Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions in Canada: Theory, Practice 
and Reform’ (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 47, 50–70. 
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horizontal equity reflects a notion of formal equality according to which like should be 
treated alike, the conclusion that two or more taxpayers are ‘similarly situated’ for the 
purpose of an income tax necessarily depends on a substantive conception of the ideal tax 
base. More concretely, since the definition of an income tax base involves inclusions and 
deductions, the measurement of an ideal base for a personal income tax requires the 
specification of appropriate inclusions and deductions. 
Among tax theorists, those who have sought to define the income tax base have generally 
favoured an expansive concept of appropriate inclusions in order to ensure that the 
income tax applies to a broad measure of each taxpayer’s ability to pay.13 According to 
Robert Haig, for example, the definition of taxable income should include ‘the money 
value of the net accretion to one’s economic power between two points of time.’14 
Similarly, suggesting that income ‘connotes, broadly, the exercise of control over the use 
of society’s scarce resources’, Henry Simons proposed that taxable income should 
include ‘(1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the 
                                                
13 See, eg, Robert Murray Haig, ‘The Concept of Income — Economic and Legal  in Robert Murray Haig 
(ed), The Federal Income Tax (Columbia University Press, 1920) 27; Henry C Simons, Personal Income 
Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy (University of Chicago Press, 1938); 
Richard A Musgrave, ‘In Defense of an Income Concept’ (1967) 81 Harvard Law Review 44; Victor 
Thuronyi, ‘The Concept of Income’ (1990) 46 Tax Law Review 45. For a more critical view, see Boris I 
Bittker, ‘A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform’ (1967) 80 Harvard Law Review 925. 
14 Haig, above n 13, 59. 
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value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in 
question.’15 
With respect to appropriate deductions, theoretical approaches differ.16 Although it is 
widely accepted that an income tax should allow deductions for reasonable expenses that 
taxpayers must incur for the purpose of producing taxable income,17 opinion is divided on 
the extent to which  non-income producing expenses should also be deductible. While 
some support the recognition of such  expenses as appropriate deductions in measuring 
each taxpayer’s ability to pay,18 others reject the deduction of  such expenses on the 
grounds that they are discretionary or otherwise irrelevant to the appropriate definition of 
taxable income,19 or inferior to other policy instruments as a way of subsidising these 
expenses.20 Yet another approach relies on Henry Simons’ definition of personal income 
                                                
15 Simons, above n 13, 49–50. 
16 For a comprehensive overview of alternative approaches, see Tim Edgar, “‘The Concept of Taxable 
Consumption and the Deductibility of Expenses under an Ideal Personal Income Tax Base”Base’ in 
Richard Krever (ed), Tax Conversations: A Guide to the Key Issues in the Tax Reform Debate, (Kluwer 
Law International, 1997) 293. 
17 See, eg, Richard Goode, The Individual Income Tax (Brookings Institution, revised ed, 1976) 75; Wayne 
R Thirsk, ‘Giving Credit where Credit Is Due: The Choice between Credits and Deductions under the 
Individual Income Tax in Canada’ (1980) 28 Canadian Tax Journal 32, 33. 
18 See, eg, Pierre Cloutier and Bernard Fortin, ‘Converting Exemptions and Deductions into Credits: An 
Economic Assessment’ in Jack Mintz and John Whalley (eds), The Economic Impacts of Tax Reform 
(Canadian Tax Foundation, 1989) 45, 54–62; Robin W Boadway and Harry M Kitchen, Canadian Tax 
Policy (Canadian Tax Foundation, 3rd ed, 1999) 131. 
19 See, eg, Neil Brooks, ‘Comments on the Paper by Robin W Boadway and Harry M Kitchen’ (1999) 47 
Canadian Tax Journal 608, 621: ‘One of the most fundamental principles underlying a fair tax system is 
that business expenses are deductible and personal expenses are not.’ See also Neil Brooks, ‘The 
Irrelevance of Conjugal Relationships in Assessing Tax Liability’ in John G Head and Richard Krever, 
(eds), Tax Units and the Rate Scale (Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1996) 35. 
20 See, eg, National Council on Welfare, The Hidden Welfare System (1976) (regarding these deductions as 
‘upside-down’ subsidies worth more to high-income taxpayers than low-income taxpayers). Implicit in this 
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as the sum of personal consumption and savings to suggest that deductions should be 
allowed for all expenditures that do not amount to personal consumption or saving by the 
taxpayer.21 
Based on these more general debates about the appropriate base for a personal income 
tax, the deduction of charitable contributions is generally defended on two distinct 
grounds. First, as professor Boris Bittker of Harvard Law School argued in 1972, 
‘charitable contributions represent a claim of such a high priority’ that they should be 
regarded as largely involuntary obligations which should be excluded ‘in determining the 
amount of income at the voluntary disposal of the taxpayer in question.’22 Alternatively, 
as his colleague William Andrews also argued in 1972, to the extent that tax burdens are 
based on the aggregate of a taxpayer’s personal consumption and accumulation, they 
should not apply to charitable gifts which enter into the consumption of needy recipients 
(in the case of ‘alms for the poor’) or provide non-exclusive or public goods and services 
(in the case of ‘philanthropy more broadly defined’ to include contributions to hospitals, 
education and culture). 23 In a similar vein, one Canadian commentator maintains that ‘the 
tax deduction simply removes the tax penalty which would otherwise result if taxpayers 
                                                                                                                                            
critique, though generally not acknowledged, is an assumption about the appropriate tax base, by reference 
to which deductions for personal expenses are characterised as subsidies. 
21 William D Andrews, ‘Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income (1972) 86 Harvard Law Review 309. 
22 Boris I Bittker, ‘The Propriety and Vitality of a Federal Income Tax Deduction for Private Philanthropy’ 
in Tax Impacts on Philanthropy: Symposium Conducted by the Tax Institute of America (Tax Institute of 
America, 1972) 145, 165. For a similar argument, see also Mark P Gergen, ‘The Case for a Charitable 
Contribution Deduction’ (1988) 74 Virginia Law Review 1393, 1426–33. 
23 Andrews, above n 21, 317–31 and 344-70. 
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had to pay taxes on income which they had voluntarily chosen not to receive personally 
but to redirect to registered charities or other qualified donees.’24 
While these arguments constitute a ‘foundational’ rationale for the deduction of 
charitable gifts on the basis that they should be, as Colinvaux explains, ‘outside the tax 
base’ and therefore properly deductible in computing taxable income,25 they are not 
uncontested. Although charitable donations that are incurred in order to earn income are 
properly deductible under any income tax that applies to net income,26 it is not obvious 
that charitable contributions are involuntary obligations, nor that the income tax should 
apply only to income that is consumed or accumulated by the person subject to tax and 
not income that is transferred to others. 
Beginning with the argument that charitable donations should be treated as deductible 
involuntary obligations, it is difficult to regard charitable contributions as involuntary in 
the same way as costs of basic subsistence, family obligations, or necessary medical care, 
                                                
24 E Blake Bromley, ‘Charity, Philanthropy and Stewardship: A Philosophical Perspective on Tax Reform’ 
(1988) 7 Philanthropist 4, 5. See also Wolfe D Goodman, ‘Correspondence’ (1980) 28 Canadian Tax 
Journal 399, contending that: ‘When a person makes a charitable donation, the money he parts with is no 
longer available for his use. … In plain English, after a person makes a charitable donation, he has less 
money to live on.’ 
25 Colinvaux, ‘Rationale and Changing the Charitable Deduction’, above n 10, 1455. 
26 See, eg, Olympia Floor & Wall Tile (Quebec) Ltd v. Minister of National Revenue [1970] Ex CR 274, in 
which the Canadian Exchequer Court allowed the deduction of charitable donations in excess of annual 
limits that applied at the time to the deduction of charitable gifts under the specific statutory deduction, on 
the basis that the taxpayer had made these donations for the purpose of earning income from increased sales 
to businesses that were headed by individuals involved in the charitable organisations to which the 
donations were made. 
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which are often deductible in computing taxable income.27 On the contrary, whatever 
moral obligation many may feel to contribute to charities, the range of organisations to 
which one may contribute and the lack of any practical or legal obligation to do so 
suggest that charitable gifts are best characterised as a discretionary form of personal 
expenditure not unlike other consumption expenses which are not deductible in 
computing a taxpayer’s income.28 For this reason as well, one might reasonably question 
Andrews’ argument that donors should be able to deduct charitable gifts because they do 
not constitute personal consumption. On the contrary, to the extent that donors are legally 
entitled to the income from which charitable donations are voluntarily made, it follows 
that this income is properly regarded as that of the donor rather than the recipient.29 
For these reasons, the ‘foundational’ argument that a charitable deduction is essential to 
properly measure taxable income represents a poor rationale for the recognition of 
                                                
27See, eg, Gwyneth McGregor, ‘Charitable Contributions’ (1961) 9 Canadian Tax Journal 441, 442 
(‘Charitable contributions … are not a vital necessity of life and are voluntary’); Edward H Rabin, 
‘Charitable Trusts and Charitable Deductions’ (1966) 41 New York University Law Review 912, 915 (‘the 
charitable deduction exists almost solely to encourage charitable giving, not to relieve hardship caused by 
“involuntary” expenses’); Boadway and Kitchen, above n 18, 71 (contrasting medical expenses, ‘which are 
almost always involuntary’, with charitable donations, which ‘are not a vital necessity of life and tend to be 
made on a voluntary basis’); Ellen P Aprill, ‘Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution 
Deduction’ (2001) 42 Boston College Law Review 843, 870 (‘charitable contributions are made voluntarily, 
as a discretionary use of income’). 
28 See, eg, James A Rendall, ‘Taxation of Contributors to Charitable Organizations under the Income Tax 
Act’ in Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Tax Conference: At the Queen Elizabeth Hotel 
Montreal, 19–21 November 1973 (Canadian Tax Foundation, 1974) 152, 153 (characterising charitable 
contributions as ‘consumption’). 
29 See, eg, Richard Krever, ‘Tax Deductions for Charitable Donations: A Tax Expenditure Analysis’ in 
Richard Krever and Gretchen Kewley (eds), Charities and Philanthropic Institutions: Reforming the Tax 
Subsidy and Regulatory Regimes (Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1991) 1, 5–8. 
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charitable contributions in a personal income tax. More promising, however, are the 
subsidy arguments to which this chapter now turns. 
Subsidy 
An alternative set of arguments for recognising charitable contributions in a personal 
income tax turns not on their foundational character in defining personal income that is 
subject to tax, but on the role that this recognition can play in serving some social or 
economic policy extrinsic to the definition of taxable income. In this respect, as 
Colinvaux explains, ‘charitable expenses are viewed as normally within the tax base, but 
an exception is created’ through a ‘subsidy, or government-provided incentive, for 
charitable giving.’30 From this perspective, it follows, tax recognition for charitable 
contributions constitutes a form of government spending or a so-called ‘tax 
expenditure’.31 
The concept of tax expenditures was pioneered in the 1960s by United States tax scholar 
Stanley Surrey, while serving as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for tax policy. 
Arguing that tax incentives were functionally equivalent to government spending, Surrey 
generally criticised tax expenditures as poorly targeted and non-transparent forms of 
government spending, which increase the complexity of the tax system, distort the 
intended incidence of the income tax, and often confer the greatest benefit on the highest 
                                                
30 Colinvaux, ‘Rationale and Changing the Charitable Deduction’, above n 10, 1455. 
31 Ibid. 
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income taxpayers. 32  More recently, however, tax expenditures have garnered more 
support on the grounds that they can be a decentralised and cost-effective way to deliver 
government spending, can be subjected to greater transparency and budgetary review, 
and can be designed in ways to avoid inequities and inefficiencies.33 
In the context of charitable contributions, two reasons are generally offered as to why a 
government might wish to provide a subsidy. First, as Colinvaux explains, a government 
might wish to encourage or reward charitable giving, either as a valuable end in itself, or 
as a way to promote a more altruistic society which might be regarded as a type of public 
good.34 Alternatively, the subsidy may be aimed not at the act of giving itself, but at the 
activities that are carried on by charitable organisations, which provide goods and 
services with broad public benefits that correspond to the preferences of donors.35 
Encouraging or Rewarding Charitable Giving 
The first of these rationales is apparent in Boris Bittker’s 1972 article, in which he 
suggests as a further rationale for a charitable deduction that ‘something can be said for 
                                                
32 See, eg, Stanley S Surrey, ‘Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A 
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures’ (1970) 83 Harvard Law Review 705; Stanley S Surrey, 
Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures (Harvard University Press, 1973); Stanley S 
Surrey and Paul R McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (Harvard University Press, 1985). 
33 See, eg, Victor Thuronyi, ‘Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment’ (1988) 6 Duke Law Journal 1155; Joint 
Committee on Taxation (US), A Reconsideration of Tax Expenditure Analysis, JCX-37-08 (2008). 
34 Colinvaux, ‘Rationale and Changing the Charitable Deduction’, above n 10, 1455. 
35 Ibid. This formulation combines two rationales suggested by Colinvaux: encouragement to the provision 
of goods and services provided by charities, and allowing individuals to direct how tax revenue should be 
allocated. 
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rewarding activities that in a certain sense are selfless, even if the reward serves no 
incentive function.’36 Similarly, Richard Goode has characterised the United States 
deduction for charitable contributions as a ‘reward’ for charitable giving.37 
Although the goal of rewarding charitable donations might justify some method of 
recognising the value of these donations in computing the donor’s income tax, it is 
doubtful whether this recognition would take the form of a deduction, the value of which 
depends more on the donor’s income than the donor’s relative generosity. On the 
contrary, as Paul McDaniel has argued: 
if there is to be a reward for charitable giving, the incidence and amount of the 
reward should bear some rational relationship to the act of charitable giving. The 
reward should be the same for persons who make a similar sacrifice, however 
measured.38 
Indeed, since low income people who give to charities tend to give a larger portion of 
their income than high income taxpayers,39 this rationale suggests that a deduction, the 
                                                
36 Bittker, ‘The Propriety and Vitality of a Federal Income Tax Deduction’, above n 22, 166. 
37 Goode, above n 17, 165. 
38 Paul R McDaniel, ‘Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Deductions: A Substitute for the Income Tax 
Deduction’ (1972) 27 Tax Law Review 377, 394. 
39 See, eg, Richard M Bird and Meyer W Bucovetsky, Canadian Tax Reform and Private Philanthropy 
(Canadian Tax Foundation, 1976) 18 (table 18) (reporting for the 1972 taxation year that for taxpayers 
claiming charitable contributions, the percentage of average income among different income groups was 
7.8 per cent for donors with incomes less than $5000, 4.1 per cent for donors with incomes of $5000 to 
$10 000, 2.9 per cent for donors with incomes of $10 000 to $20 000, 2.4 per cent for donors with incomes 
of $20 000 to $50 000, 2.4 per cent for donors with incomes of $50 000 to $100 000, and 3.6 per cent for 
donors with incomes exceeding $100 000). 
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value of which increases as the donor’s income rises, has the reward structure backwards. 
Instead, assuming a diminishing marginal utility of income, one might favour a benefit 
that decreases as the donor’s income increases. Neil Brooks, for example, has suggested 
that a tax credit for charitable contributions ‘could be set at 30 per cent for those with 
incomes over $35 000; 40 per cent for those with incomes from $25 000 to $35 000, and 
so on, down to those with incomes under $10 000, where the credit might be set at 100 
per cent.’40 To the extent that a donor’s relative sacrifice depends on  wealth as well as 
income, moreover, one might imagine a tax benefit that decreases as the donor’s wealth 
and income increase. 
Alternatively, the amount of the tax benefit might vary according to the percentage of the 
taxpayer’s annual income and/or wealth that the taxpayer contributes to eligible 
recipients during the year.41 On this basis, for example, Paul McDaniel proposed a 
matching grant for charitable donations that would rise from five per cent of aggregate 
donations from donors contributing less than two per cent of their incomes to charities to 
50 per cent of aggregate donations from donors contributing more than 10 per cent of 
their incomes to charities.42 For similar reasons, others have advocated a floor on any tax 
recognition for charitable contributions, set at a fixed percentage of each taxpayer’s 
                                                
40 Neil Brooks, ‘Financing the Voluntary Sector: Replacing the Charitable Deduction’ (Working Paper, 
Law and Economics Workshop Series, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1981) 24. 
41 See, eg, McDaniel, above n 38, 394 (arguing that the reward rationale ‘appears to call for a system which 
increases the reward as the individual sacrifices a greater proportion of his income to charity’). 
42 Ibid 397. 
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income for the year.43 In the United States, for example, the Congressional Budget Office 
has proposed allowing the charitable contribution deduction only for contributions in 
excess of two per cent of the donor’s adjusted gross income.44 The Canadian Royal 
Commission on Taxation (also known as the Carter Commission) similarly considered, 
but rejected, a floor set at one per cent of the donor’s income.45 Besides targeting the 
‘reward’ to the most generous contributors, such a floor would also reduce administrative 
costs associated with tax assistance for charitable giving.46 
Although a reward rationale for the tax recognition of charitable contributions suggests a 
number of possible methods for this recognition, the rationale itself is problematic. While 
generosity is undoubtedly worthy of praise, it is not clear that it merits monetary rewards. 
On the contrary, as critics from radically different philosophical perspectives have 
observed, to reward generosity through monetary means contradicts the spirit underlying 
the virtue of generosity, ‘corrupt[ing] the essential dignity and altruism of a simple 
gift’,47 and ‘accentuat[ing] the purely selfish goal of reducing one’s own taxes.’48 
                                                
43 See, eg, Bittker, ‘The Propriety and Vitality of a Federal Income Tax Deduction’, above n 22, 169 
(suggesting that the floor should exclude the least generous 10 or 20 per cent of donors); Goode, above n 
17, 165 (explaining that such a measure would ‘focus the reward or incentive more sharply by withdrawing 
the deduction from persons whose contributions are small relative to income while continuing it for heavier 
contributions’). 
44 Congressional Budget Office (US), Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options (2011) 150. 
45 Canada, Royal Commission on Taxation, Report (1966) vol 3, 224. 
46 See, eg, Rendall, above n 28, 159; Goode, above n 17, 165. See also the discussion in Aprill, above n 27, 
859–62 (proposing the idea of an income-related floor on deductible charitable contributions as a solution 
to administrative concerns with the extension of the deduction to non-itemisers in the US). 
47 Bromley, above n 24, 12. 
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Moreover, as John Colombo suggests, ‘the work of social scientists may indicate that 
providing a material reward for giving may actually decrease the giving rate where part 
of what individuals want from their donation is the “warm glow” and increased self-
esteem from behaving altruistically.’49 As a result, as a rationale for the tax recognition of 
charitable contributions, the reward rationale is no more persuasive than the argument 
that a deduction is necessary to ensure an accurate measure of taxable income. 
Subsidising Charitable Activities 
A second rationale for subsidising charitable gifts looks not to the act of giving itself, but 
to the ends that these gifts finance, defending tax incentives for charitable contributions 
as an indirect subsidy to the activities that are carried on by charitable organisations. In 
order to understand this rationale and its implications for the design of a tax incentive for 
charitable giving, it is necessary to explain first why governments might wish to subsidise 
charitable organisations and second why they might wish to do so indirectly through the 
personal income tax rather than directly through grants to charitable organizations 
themselves. 
                                                                                                                                            
48 Neil Brooks, ‘The Tax Credit for Charitable Contributions: Giving Credit where None Is Due’ in Jim 
Phillips, Bruce Chapman, and David Stevens (eds), Between State and Market: Essays on Charities Law 
and Policy in Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) 457, 464. See also Gergen, above n 22, 
1394 (asking why, if a society values altruism, it would want to ‘sully’ this virtue with ‘a pecuniary 
reward’). 
49  John D Colombo, ‘The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: 
Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption’ (2001) Wake Forest Law Review 657, 677. 
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Rationale for Government Subsidies 
Among economists, the charitable sector is generally regarded as a provider of quasi-
public goods and services — the essential characteristics of which are non-rivalness, 
meaning that enjoyment by one person does not preclude enjoyment by another, and non-
excludability, meaning that it is difficult or impossible to exclude a person from enjoying 
the benefit if he or she refuses to pay for it.50 Where a good or service is relatively non-
rival and/or non-excludable, economic theory suggests that private markets will either 
oversupply the good or service (in the case of non-rival but excludable goods and 
services) or undersupply the good or service (in the case of non-excludable goods or 
services). In either case, the resolution of these ‘market imperfections’ is one of the main 
economic justifications for the existence of a public sector which provides these ‘public’ 
goods and services directly, distributing their costs among individual beneficiaries 
through taxes and other levies.51 
In addition to the public sector, the charitable sector represents another response to the 
existence of market imperfections, providing various goods and services such as 
education, culture, and religion, the benefits of which are relatively non-rival and/or non-
excludable. Indeed, since charitable organisations enable individuals to select a range of  
                                                
50 See, eg, Kimberley Scharf, Ben Cherniavsky and Roy Hogg, ‘Tax Incentives for Charities in Canada’ 
(Working Paper No CPRN 03, Canadian Policy Research Networks, 1997) 4–5. 
51 In addition to this economic justification for the existence of a public sector, public finance scholars 
typically identify as other ‘fiscal functions’ the ‘distribution function’ to moderate inequalities in the 
distribution of market outcomes, and the ‘stabilisation function’ to moderate macroeconomic fluctuations 
associated with the business cycle. See, eg, Richard A Musgrave, Peggy B Musgrave and Richard M Bird, 
Public Finance in Theory and Practice (McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987). 
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goods and services corresponding to their own values and preferences, this sector may 
have distinct advantages over the broader public sector in providing a mix of such goods 
and services that are more compatible with the demands of a diverse society. 52 
Furthermore, to the extent that the charitable sector is more innovative and service-
oriented than the traditional public sector, it may provide a more efficient vehicle for the 
delivery of certain  goods and services.53 In addition, by relieving the public sector from 
sole responsibility for providing public goods and services, the charitable sector lessens 
the fiscal burdens of the public sector, making it better able to perform the important 
redistributive, allocative and stabilisation functions that only it can effectively fulfil.54 
For all of these reasons, a good argument can be made that the public sector should 
provide financial support to charitable organisations. Where charitable organisations 
provide alternative methods of delivering  goods and services to those employed by the 
                                                
52 See, eg, Lester M Salamon, ‘Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of Government-Nonprofit 
Relations’ in Walter W Powell (ed), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (Yale University Press, 
1987) 99. See also Krever, above n 29, 8–13. 
53 See, eg, Scharf, Cherniavsky and Hogg, above n 50, 5 (suggesting that ‘voluntary organizations foster a 
do-it-yourself culture, which can improve accountability, encourage technological innovation, and promote 
efficiency in the use of resources, which may be more desirable if government provision is encumbered 
with a lot of bureaucracy.’). See also Richard Domingue, The Charity ‘Industry’ and Its Tax Treatment 
(Minister of Supply and Services, 1995) 3 (arguing that ‘[a]t a time when attempts are being made to 
reinvent government, it should perhaps be recognized that social services could be provided much more 
efficiently by charitable organizations. It could be that communities and local agencies are in a better 
position to assess and meet these needs economically than government employees working in a capital city 
far removed from the people they serve.’). 
54 See, eg, McGregor, above n 27, 442 (noting that charitable contributions ‘relieve the government of some 
of its responsibilities, and make possible some activities, such as those of a cultural nature, which the 
government might not feel impelled, or be able, to afford to carry on.’). 
Deleted: 30
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traditional public sector, this quasi-public function should be supported by public funds.55 
To the extent that charitable organisations provide  goods and services that might 
otherwise be provided by the public sector, moreover, economic theory supports the 
subsidisation of these activities in order to prevent their undersupply.56 
Rationales for Indirect Subsidies 
Although these considerations may provide a rationale for subsidising activities carried 
on by charitable organisations, they do not explain why these subsidies should take the 
form of indirect subsidies through the tax system rather than direct subsidies in the form 
of grants to charitable organisations themselves. Two further rationales are generally 
offered for these indirect subsidies: (1) that tax incentives may increase the amount of 
charitable donations by more than the cost of the tax incentive, so that they are a more 
cost-effective way to subsidise charities than direct government grants; and (2) that 
indirect subsidies are a more decentralised and pluralistic way to support charities than 
direct grants, since they enable taxpayers themselves to select the charitable activities and 
organisations to which they wish to direct public funds. 
                                                
55 Joint Committee on Taxation (US), Present Law and Background Relating to the Federal Tax Treatment 
of Charitable Contributions, JCX-4-13 (2013) 33 (‘sometimes charitable organizations provide goods or 
services that the government would otherwise provide. These charitable gifts are then private contributions 
to create public goods that alleviate the burden on government.’) 
56 See, eg, ibid 34; Harold M Hochman and James D Rodgers, ‘The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable 
Contributions’ (1977 30 National Tax Journal 1, 2–3; Gergen, above n 22, 1396–414. 
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The Cost-Effectiveness of Tax Incentives and Charitable Giving 
The cost-effectiveness of a tax incentive for charitable contributions depends on the 
extent to which the aggregate amount of charitable gifts increases in response to a 
decrease in their after-tax cost as a result of the incentive — a relationship that 
economists describe as the ‘price elasticity of giving’.57 Since reductions in the after-tax 
cost of gifts are financed by forgone tax revenues, the price elasticity of charitable giving 
reflects the cost-effectiveness of the tax incentive as a means of funding the charitable 
sector. While a price elasticity greater than one means that charitable donations 
attributable to the incentive increase by more than the tax cost of the incentive, a price 
elasticity less than one means that forgone tax revenues attributable to the incentive 
exceed the resulting increase in charitable donations. 
A substantial body of literature has developed over the past 40 years as economists have 
attempted to obtain reliable estimates of the price elasticity of charitable giving — though 
most of this literature is from the United States so may reflect aspects of its tax regime 
for charitable donations as well as its philanthropic culture more generally.58 Although 
                                                
57 For a useful introduction to this concept, see Scharf, Cherniavsky and Hogg, above n 50, 8–9. 
58 For useful summaries of this literature, see J A Johnson, ‘The Determinants of Charitable Giving with 
Special Emphasis on the Income Deduction under the Income Tax — A Survey of the Empirical Literature’ 
(1981) 3 Canadian Taxation 258; Charles T Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving, 
(University of Chicago Press, 1985) 16–99; Scharf, Cherniavsky and Hogg, above n 50, 11–17; E Brown, 
‘Taxes and Charitable Giving: Is There a New Conventional Wisdom?’ in Proceedings of the Eighty-Ninth 
Annual Conference on Taxation (National Tax Association, 1996) 153; Productivity Commission, above 
n 2, G21–G32. 
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the earliest studies reported relatively low price elasticities of charitable giving,59 
suggesting that tax incentives are a relatively inefficient means of funding charitable 
organisations,60 subsequent studies reported price elasticities greater than one.61 While 
more recent studies using more sophisticated data reported much lower estimates of price 
elasticities,62 again calling into question the efficiency of tax incentives as a method of 
funding the charitable sector,63 these results have been challenged by other recent studies 
reporting price elasticities greater than one.64 Overall, a meta-analysis of 69 ‘price 
                                                
59 See, eg, Michael K Taussig, ‘Economic Aspects of the Personal Income Tax Treatment of Charitable 
Contributions’ (1967) 20 National Tax Journal 1; Robert A Schwartz, ‘Personal Philanthropic 
Contributions’ (1970) 78 Journal of Political Economy 1264; R D Hood, S A Martin and L S Osberg, 
‘Economic Determinants of Individual Charitable Donations in Canada’ (1977) 10 Canadian Journal of 
Economics 653. 
60 See, eg, Rendall, above n 28, 158–9; Dennis B Wolkoff, ‘Proposal for a Radical Alternative to the 
Charitable Deduction’ [1973] Law Forum 279, 291–3; Brooks, ‘Financing the Voluntary Sector’, above 
n 40, 18–21. 
61 See, eg, Martin Feldstein, ‘The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part I — Aggregate and 
Distributional Effects’ (1975) 28 National Tax Journal 81; Charles T Clotfelter and C Eugene Steuerle, 
‘Charitable Contributions’ in Henry J Aaron and Joseph A Pechman (eds), How Taxes Affect Economic 
Behavior (Brookings Institution, 1980) 403; Harry Kitchen and Richard Dalton, ‘Determinants of 
Charitable Donations by Families in Canada: A Regional Analysis’ (1990) 22 Applied Economics 285; 
Harry Kitchen, ‘Determinants of Charitable Donations in Canada: A Comparison over Time’ (1992) 24 
Applied Economics 709. 
62 See, eg, Richard Steinberg, ‘Taxes and Giving: New Findings’ (1990) 1 Voluntas 76; Leonard E Burman 
and William C Randolph, ‘Measuring Permanent Responses to Capital-Gains Tax Changes in Panel Data’ 
(1994) 84 American Economic Review 794; William C Randolph, ‘Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, 
and the Timing of Charitable Contributions’ (1995) 103 Journal of Political Economy 709; Kevin Stanton 
Barrett, Anya M McGuirk, and Richard Steinberg, ‘Further Evidence on the Dynamic Impact of Taxes on 
Charitable Giving’ (1997) 50 National Tax Journal 321; Pamela Greene and Robert McClelland, ‘Taxes 
and Charitable Giving’ (2001) 54 National Tax Journal 443. 
63 See, eg, Brooks, ‘The Tax Credit for Charitable Contributions’, above n 48, 471–2 (concluding on the 
basis of these studies that ‘the best evidence tells us that the amount [of charitable giving stimulated by the 
Canadian tax credit] is considerably less than the government loses in revenue. … If the government were 
to repeal the tax credit and allocate the saved revenue through semi-autonomous government agencies to 
the voluntary sector, much of the charitable sector would have considerable additional revenue.’). 
64 See, eg, Laura Tiehan, ‘Tax Policy and Charitable Contributions of Money’ (2001) 54 National Tax 
Journal 707; Gerald E Auten, Holger Sieg and Charles T Clotfelter, ‘Charitable Giving, Income and Taxes: 
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elasticity of giving’ studies from 1967 to 2004 derives a weighted average price elasticity 
greater than one,65 suggesting again that tax incentives may be a cost-effective way to 
subsidise charitable organisations. 
In addition to these studies, other studies have examined the relationship between the 
price elasticity of charitable giving and other variables such as the type of charitable 
organisation and the income of the donor. While some studies have suggested that the 
price elasticity of charitable giving is lower for donations to religious organisations than 
other charities,66 indicating that tax incentives are an inefficient way to fund religious 
organisations, these conclusions have been challenged by other studies suggesting that 
the price elasticity of giving to religious organisations is higher than the price elasticity of 
giving for other purposes.67 Other studies have suggested that the price elasticity of 
charitable giving increases as income increases,68 suggesting that tax incentives directed 
                                                                                                                                            
An Analysis of Panel Data’ (2002) 92 American Economic Review 371; Arthur C Brooks, ‘Income Tax 
Policy and Charitable Giving’ (2007) 26 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 599; Jon Bakija and 
Bradley T Heim, ‘How Does Charitable Giving Respond to Incentives and Income? New Estimates from 
Panel Data’ (2011) 64 National Tax Journal 615; Balayet Hossain and Laura Lamb, ‘Price Elasticities of 
Charitable Giving across Donation Sectors in Canada: Is the Tax Incentive Efficient?’ [2012] International 
Scholarly Research Network Economics <http://www.hindawi.com/isrn/economics/2012/421789>. 
65 John Peloza and Piers Steel, ‘The Price Elasticities of Charitable Contributions: A Meta-Analysis’ (2005) 
24 Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 260. 
66See, eg, Feldstein, ‘The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part I’, above n 61; Kitchen and 
Dalton, above n 61; Hossain and Lamb, above n 64. 
67 See, eg, William S Reece, ‘Charitable Contributions: New Evidence on Household Behavior’ (1979) 69 
American Economic Review 142; and Robert J Yetman and Michelle Yetman, ‘How Does the Incentive 
Effect of the Charitable Deduction Vary across Charities?’ (2013) 88 Accounting Review 1069.  
68See, eg, Henry Aaron, ‘Federal Encouragement of Private Giving’ in Tax Impacts on Philanthropy: 
Symposium  by the Tax Institute of America (Tax Institute of America, 1972) 211; Graham Glenday, Anil K 
Gupta, and Henry Pawlak, ‘Tax Incentives for Personal Charitable Contributions’ (1986) 68 Review of 
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at high-income earners may be more efficient than tax incentives directed at lower-
income taxpayers, though this conclusion has also been questioned by other studies.69 
Finally, although empirical studies do not appear to have confirmed the result, one might 
expect that donations of capital property may be more responsive to the price of 
charitable giving than contributions from recurring income from which taxpayers may 
donate a fixed percentage. 
Choice, Pluralism, and Indirect Subsidies 
An additional argument for subsidising charities indirectly turns on the decentralised 
manner in which this subsidy is delivered, through contributions by donors, rather than 
decisions by government agencies.70 To the extent that these indirect subsidies allow 
individuals to select the charitable activities to which they wish to direct support without 
having to obtain the agreement of a political majority, they are generally preferable to 
direct grants in promoting the very diversity and innovation that accounts for the 
charitable sector’s unique advantages over the traditional public sector. In addition, 
although it might be argued that direct matching grants would be as consistent with this 
                                                                                                                                            
Economics and Statistics 688; and Christopher M Duquette, ‘Is Charitable Giving by Nonitemizers 
Responsive to Tax Incentives? New Evidence’ (1999) 52 National Tax Journal 195. 
69 See, eg, Michael J Boskin and Martin Feldstein, ‘Effects of Charitable Deductions on Contributions by 
Low Income and Middle Income Households: Evidence from the National Survey of Philanthropy’ (1978) 
59 Review of Economics and Statistics 351; Yong S Choe and Jinook Jeong, ‘Charitable Contributions by 
Low- and Middle-Income Taxpayers: Further Evidence with a New Method’ (1993) 66 National Tax 
Journal 33; Bakija and Heim, above n 65, 647 (concluding that ‘[w]e do not find strong evidence of 
differences in persistent price elasticities across income levels’). 
70 For a similar conclusion, see Krever, above n 29, 11–13. For a more general discussion of the use of the 
tax system to vote on public spending decisions, see Saul Levmore, ‘Taxes as Ballots’ (1998) 65 University 
of Chicago Law Review 387. 
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objective as indirect tax expenditures,71 the latter are more likely than the former to 
withstand the kinds of political controls that would undermine their effectiveness in 
promoting a diverse and independent charitable sector.72 
As a result, even if tax incentives were a less cost-effective method of subsidising 
charitable organisations than direct government grants, a strong argument can be made 
that the former are preferable to the latter on broader policy grounds. As Harold 
Hochman and James Rodgers have noted: ‘Public policy involves much more than 
whether an additional dollar of subsidies can generate more than a dollar of charity.’73 
Form of Tax Incentive for Charitable Contributions 
Although these arguments may provide a rationale for indirectly subsidising charitable 
activities through a tax incentive for charitable contributions, they do not clearly define 
the specific form that this tax incentive should take. 
                                                
71 See, eg, Brooks, ‘Financing the Voluntary Sector’, above n 40. 
72 See, eg, Bittker, ‘The Propriety and Vitality of a Federal Income Tax Deduction’, above n 22, 147–52 
(concluding that ‘I have very little confidence that a system of matching grants could be administered 
without administrative and congressional investigations, loyalty oaths, informal or implicit warnings 
against heterodoxy, and the other trappings of governmental support than the tax deduction has, so far, been 
able to escape’); Goode, above n 17, 163 (considering it ‘unlikely’ that a system of direct matching grants 
‘would be as free of undesirable controls or would serve the values of pluralism as well’); John G Simon, 
‘Charity and Dynasty under the Federal Tax System’ (1978) 5 Probate Lawyer 1, 82 (observing that ‘[t]he 
tax allowance method has at least the virtue that it does not call upon the government to play an active role 
in singling out the chosen few’); Krever, above n 29, 21–5 (concluding that ‘a matching grant system 
cannot effectively promote the values of pluralism. If pluralist decision making in the allocation of the 
government funds for charitable purposes is to be preserved, proposals to replace the current tax 
expenditure with a matching grant system must be viewed with suspicion.’); Evelyn Brody, ‘Charities in 
Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert’ (1999) 66 Tennessee Law Review 687, 757 
(suggesting that ‘one of the reasons why we use the indirect tax subsidy approach is that we are a very 
heterogeneous society. As such, we find it difficult to agree on which functions to subsidize.’). 
73 Hochman and Rodgers, above n 56, 11. 
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To the extent that the subsidy is designed to support the provision of quasi-public goods 
and services, one approach might be to vary the tax benefit according to the public 
character of the activity carried on by the charitable organisation, providing larger tax 
benefits for contributions to organisations that fulfil broad public functions and smaller 
tax benefits for contributions to organisations providing more limited public benefits. 
According to Wayne Thirsk, for example: 
it would be desirable to disaggregate within an expenditure category and confer 
different rates of credit on items that contribute different amounts of social 
benefit. Not all charitable activities, for example, may yield the same degree of 
social value, in which case a policy of differentiated tax credits is called for.74 
Similarly, on the basis that high-income donors tend to give more to organisations like 
hospitals, universities and cultural institutions that provide greater social benefits than 
churches and religious organisations favoured by lower-income donors,75 some have 
                                                
74 Thirsk, above n 17, 41–2. See also Hochman and Rodgers, above n 56, 14 (arguing that ‘[t]he proper 
level of the tax credit depends … on the “external” content of the benefits that the charity-financed 
activities confer; it depends, in other words, on the relationship between the marginal evaluations of the 
primary sharing group, namely voluntary donors, and the community-at-large.’); Scharf, Cherniavsky and 
Hogg, above n 50, 9 (suggesting that ‘we should try to encourage donations to charities that provide goods 
or services to a large number of consumers’); Hossain and Lamb, above n 64, 6 (suggesting that ‘[p]ublic 
policy could be used to tailor tax credit rates to reflect society’s preferences and needs by setting unique tax 
credit rates for the different donation sectors’); Colinvaux, ‘Rationale and Changing the Charitable 
Deduction’, above n 10, 1458 (observing that ‘[i]f a functional or activities-based approach to the tax 
benefit is the priority, a credit might make more sense than a deduction, perhaps with higher credit 
percentages (a larger tax benefit) for the preferred type of organization’). 
75 For studies suggesting that high-income donors tend to give more to hospitals, universities, and cultural 
institutions, while low-income donors favour churches and religious organisations, see Taussig, above n 59; 
Martin Feldstein, ‘The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part II — The Impact on Religious, 
Educational and Other Organizations’ (1975) 28 National Tax Journal 209; Kitchen and Dalton, above 
n 61. 
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argued in favour of a deduction for charitable contributions on the basis that it would 
provide a larger indirect subsidy to ‘more worthy’ organisations than a revenue-neutral 
flat-rate credit.76 
Although this approach may be theoretically sound, it is likely to founder on the actual 
measurement of ‘public benefits’, which are subject to dispute,77 and can depend on value 
judgments that are often difficult to reconcile.78 More importantly, since an indirect 
subsidy in the form of a tax incentive is designed to promote pluralism in the allocation 
of public funds, any decision to favour some activities over others is arguably 
incompatible with the rationale for a tax incentive as opposed to direct government 
grants. Indeed, to the extent that pluralism itself is regarded as a public good, it follows 
                                                
76 See, Faye Woodman, ‘The Tax Treatment of Charities and Charitable Donations since the Carter 
Commission: Past Reforms and Present Problems”Problems’ (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 537, 
575 (‘Simply, an argument may be made that some institutions are richer contributors to the social, cultural, 
and intellectual mosaic than others. Hence, it may be possible to justify a system of deduction that is 
skewed in the direction of the favourite charities of upper-income taxpayers.’). For a ‘somewhat less elitist’ 
version of this argument, see Simon, above n 72, 69 (suggesting that ‘whether or not wealthy givers are 
better suited to uphold cultural and intellectual standards, affluent individuals are more likely to be 
idiosyncratic or unorthodox’ and contending that this ‘idiosyncrasy and heterodoxy’ might ‘justify … the 
inegalitarian charitable deduction in the name of pluralism’).  
77 See, eg, Scharf, Cherniavsky and Hogg, above n 50, 28 (‘Available evidence … seems to suggest that the 
activities of the nonprofit organizations and charities typically supported by the rich do not produce higher 
valued externalities than do those supported by lower income earners. In fact, the converse may be true: 
universities and cultural organizations are charities that may be viewed as more “local” than churches and 
religious organizations. Thus larger giving by high income earners should be discouraged on efficiency 
grounds, while smaller gifts by low income earners should be encouraged.’); Duff, ‘Charitable 
Contributions and the Personal Income Tax’, above n 8, 435 (‘In a pluralistic society, … who is to say that 
the public benefits associated with religious activities are any less than those associated with higher 
education?’). 
78 See, eg, Wolkoff, above n 60, 288 (most religious gifts ‘help maintain the donors’ congregations’ and are 
‘directed at satisfying the needs of the donor, not at satisfying the needs of society at large’); Bromley, 
above n 24, 14 (‘Religious activities are justifiably “charitable” on the basis that they are beneficial to the 
community as a whole because they contribute to bettering the conduct and character of citizens.’). 
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that a tax incentive for charitable contributions should not discriminate among different 
activities or organisations, except to deny charitable status to organisations the aims or 
activities of which contradict the values of a free and democratic society. To the extent 
that governments wish to prefer certain activities or organisations, moreover, they can 
(and often do) do so through direct grants.  
Alternatively, to the extent that the tax incentive is intended to subsidise the charitable 
sector in a cost-effective manner, the tax incentive might vary according to the price 
elasticity of the donation, with lesser tax benefits for charitable gifts that are determined 
to be less price elastic and larger tax benefits for charitable gifts that are determined to be 
more price elastic. On this basis, some proposals have relied on studies suggesting that 
high-income taxpayers are more sensitive to the price of charitable giving than low-
income taxpayers to support tax incentives, such as deductions or exemptions on 
substantial gifts of property, that provide greater tax benefits to high-income taxpayers 
than low-income taxpayers.79 Others have relied on studies suggesting that charitable 
gifts to religious organisations are less elastic than charitable gifts to health and education 
to suggest that donations to the former should attract lower tax benefits than donations to 
the latter.80 
                                                
79 See, eg, Productivity Commission, above n 2, G29 (suggesting that ‘policies targeted at promoting giving 
by high-income individuals may be more (treasury) efficient’). 
80 Hossain and Lamb, above n 64, 6 (concluding that ‘[d]onations to religious organizations are not price 
elastic suggesting that the tax credit may not be fiscally efficient for the religious sector’). 
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The problem with this argument for the design of a charitable contributions tax incentive 
is threefold. First, as the brief summary of empirical studies above shows, there is little 
consensus on the relationship between price elasticity of charitable giving and variables 
such as the type of charitable organisation and the income of the donor.81 Second, to the 
extent that the tax incentives for charitable giving provide more generous tax benefits to 
high-income taxpayers than low-income taxpayers, they raise concerns about the 
equitable distribution of tax benefits across income classes that must be weighed against 
the presumed cost-effectiveness of these incentives. Finally, to the extent that tax 
incentives favour donations to one type of charitable organisation over another, they 
contradict one of the main objectives of an indirect subsidy for charitable contributions, 
which is to promote pluralism in the allocation of public funds to the charitable sector. 
For these reasons, one might reasonably criticise deductions for charitable contributions, 
which differentiate among donors by providing a larger tax subsidy for contributions 
from high-income donors than low-income donors and no subsidy for contributions from 
donors whose incomes are too low to pay any tax. To the extent that charitable 
contributions operate as ‘votes’ to direct public subsidies to the organisations of the 
donor’s choosing,82 a deduction weighs the votes of high-income donors more heavily 
than those of lower-income donors and completely disenfranchises the lowest-income 
donors who pay no tax. For this reason as well, one might reasonably criticise the non-
                                                
81 See above nn 66–69 and accompanying text. 
82 Levmore, above n 70.  
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taxation of gains on gifts of  property, which provides the greatest tax benefit not only to 
high-income taxpayers subject to the highest marginal tax rate, but to particularly affluent 
taxpayers with property that has increased in value.83 Rather than promoting genuine 
pluralism, these tax incentives are apt to foster a kind of ‘philanthropic paternalism’ as a 
result of which the mix of goods and services provided by the charitable sector is shaped 
more by an affluent minority than by the community as a whole. 
Consequently, as I have argued elsewhere,84 a tax incentive for charitable contributions 
should ideally take the form of a tax credit or rebate the value of which does not vary 
according to the donor’s level of income.85 In addition, the credit should be fully 
refundable in order to ensure that this subsidy is available not only for donations from 
donors with tax otherwise payable but also for contributions from donors whose incomes 
are too low to pay tax.86  
                                                
83 For an excellent critique of US rules which allow taxpayers to deduct the fair market value of charitable 
gifts of property without paying tax on accrued gains, see Roger Colinvaux, ‘Charitable Contributions of 
Property: A Broken System Reimagined’ (2013) 50 Harvard Journal on Legislation 263. 
84 Duff, ‘Charitable Contributions and the Personal Income Tax’, above n 8, 435–7; Duff, ‘The Tax 
Treatment of Charitable Contributions in Canada’, above n 12, 67–9. 
85 For a similar argument to this effect, see Krever, above n 29, 19–21, 25–6 (criticising the ‘upside-down’ 
character of a deduction and recommending a flat-rate ‘tax rebate’ which ‘could be used to offset part of 
the taxpayer’s tax liability’). Alternatively, the credit might include a declining rate structure based on the 
amount claimed, thereby promoting a more genuine pluralism by providing a larger subsidy for small and 
medium-sized donations and a smaller subsidy for large donations. 
86 For similar arguments, see McDaniel, above n 38, 391 (suggesting that society would be ‘greatly 
enhanced’ by extending the pluralism of a tax incentive for charitable contributions to 100 per cent of 
contributors); Brooks, ‘Financing the Voluntary Sector’, above n 40, 23–4 (favouring a refundable tax 
credit). 
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Recent Canadian Experience 
Like Australia and the United States, Canada used to provide a deduction for charitable 
contributions, which was first introduced in 1917 for a limited category of donations, and 
expanded in 1930 to donations to all charitable organisations.87 In 1988, however, this 
deduction was converted into a non-refundable credit. The following sections consider 
the rationale and effects of this tax reform as well as more recent reforms which have 
exempted gifts of property from tax on capital gains and increased income-related 
ceilings on the amount that individual taxpayers may claim in respect of charitable gifts. 
Conversion of Deduction to Credit 
Since a deduction for charitable gifts provides a tax benefit equivalent to the donor’s 
marginal tax rate, it is worth more to high-income donors than low-income donors, 
resulting in a regressive distribution of the indirect subsidy for charitable activities. 
Although the Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation acknowledged this regressivity 
when it examined the charitable deduction in 1966, maintaining that it ‘would propose a 
system of credits for charitable donations’ if equity were the only consideration,88 the 
Commission resisted this conclusion on the grounds that ‘private philanthropy performs a 
worthwhile social purpose’ and ‘[t]he credit approach would … tend to stifle charitable 
                                                
87 Duff, ‘Charitable Contributions and the Personal Income Tax’, above n 8, 408. 
88 Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 45, vol 3, 222 (explaining that ‘[t]he tax concession would … 
be related only to the size of the donation and would not also depend upon the income of the taxpayer’). 
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giving by upper income individuals and families.’89 As a result, it concluded, ‘the 
fundamental feature of the present system, the deduction of charitable donations from 
income, should be continued.’90 
In the 1970s and 1980s, however, deductions for charitable contributions came under 
increasing criticism in Canada and the United States, on the basis that they were 
regressive tax expenditures that should be replaced by matching grants or tax credits.91 In 
1987, the Canadian federal government accepted these criticisms, announcing that it 
would amend the Income Tax Act (‘ITA’)92 by converting the deduction to a credit that 
would ‘increase fairness by basing tax assistance on the amount given, regardless of the 
income level of the donor.’93 Instead of establishing a flat-rate credit, however, the 
government introduced a two-tiered credit according to which charitable contributions 
claimed in the year up to $250 would be creditable at the lowest marginal rate while 
amounts exceeding this threshold would be creditable at the top marginal rate.94 At the 
time, this statutory rule implied a federal credit of 17 per cent on amounts claimed up to 
$250 and 29 per cent on amounts exceeding $250 — or a combined federal and 
provincial credit of approximately 25 per cent on amounts up to $250 and 50 per cent on 
                                                
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 See, eg, McDaniel, above n 38; Thirsk, above n 17; Brooks, ‘Financing the Voluntary Sector’, above 
n 40. 
92 RSC 1985, c 1. 
93 Michael Wilson, Tax Reform 1987: White Paper (Minister of Supply and Services, 1987) 32. 
94 Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1, s 118.1(3) }(‘ITA’), inserted by SC 1988, c 55, s 92. 
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amounts exceeding this threshold. The threshold was reduced to $200 in 1994, 95 the 
lowest marginal rate is now 15 per cent, and provincial governments have varied their 
credit rates over time, so that the combined federal and provincial credits now range from 
approximately 20–25 per cent on amounts claimed up to $200 and approximately 40–50 
per cent on amounts over this threshold. 
The reasons for the two-tiered credit were not fully explained by the government, but are 
partly reflected in its statement that the credit would be designed to ‘maintain a 
substantial incentive for charitable giving.’96 Since a flat-rate credit could achieve this 
result only if the rate were set at or near the top marginal rate, which would substantially 
increase the cost of the tax incentive in terms of forgone tax revenues,97 the government 
settled on a two-tiered credit in order to maintain a comparable incentive to a deduction 
for high-income donors giving more than $250 per year, while limiting the incentive for 
all donors giving less than this amount. 
Although the government estimated that the proposed amendment would cost an 
additional $80 million per year, increasing the aggregate level of federal assistance for 
                                                
95 SC 1995, c 3, s 34. 
96 Wilson, above n 93, 32. 
97 According to a Canadian study published in 1986, a revenue-neutral tax credit set at a combined federal 
and provincial rate of 29 per cent would cause aggregate donations to fall by $10 million, while a credit set 
at a combined federal and provincial rate of 50 per cent would increase aggregate donations by only $6 
million at a cost in terms of forgone revenue of $422 million: Glenday, Gupta and Pawlak, above n 68. See 
also Hood, Martin and Osberg, above n 59. 
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charitable giving to $900 million in 1988,98 figures indicate that the cost of the charitable 
credit was $670 million in 1988, $750 million in 1989, $815 million in 1990, $845 
million in 1991, $865 million in 1992, $880 million in 1993, and reached $900 million 
only in 1994.99 As a result, although other factors undoubtedly influenced the level of 
charitable contributions and the total amount of forgone revenue, it appears that the  
conversion of the deduction into a two-tiered credit reduced the aggregate amount of 
federal assistance for charitable giving. 
With respect to the distribution of this federal assistance, analysis of tax return statistics 
from 1988 indicates that the two-tiered credit was more generous than a deduction for 
low-income taxpayers, and essentially the same as a deduction for middle- and high-
income taxpayers. As Table 1 illustrates, since average contributions by donors with 
incomes less than $25 000 exceeded the $250 threshold, a portion of these gifts was 
creditable at the top marginal rate, resulting in a more generous tax benefit than that 
which would have resulted from a deduction at the 17 per cent federal marginal tax rate 
applicable to taxpayers with incomes less than $25 000. For taxpayers with incomes 
 
 
                                                
98 Department of Finance (Canada), Supplementary Information Relating to Tax Reform Measures (1987) 
10. 
99 See Government of Canada, Personal Income Tax Expenditures (Department of Finance, 1992) 14; 
Government of Canada, Personal and Corporate Income Tax Expenditures (Department of Finance, 1993) 
19; Government of Canada, Tax Expenditures (Department of Finance, 1997) 29. 
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Table 1 
Average Federal Charitable Tax Credit Rates by Income Class 
(1988) 
Income Class ($) Average Donation 
for Taxfilers 
Claiming 
Donations100 ($) 
Average Federal 
Charitable Tax 
Credit101 ($) 
Average Federal 
Charitable Tax Credit 
Rate102 (%) 
Federal 
Marginal Tax 
Rate (%) 
1–25 000 333.37 81.44 24.4 17 
25 000–50 000 453.39 115.22 25.4 17–26 
50 000–100 000 772.91 203.14 26.3 26–29 
100 000–250 000 2100.39 583.66 27.8 29 
Over 250 000 9542.42 2739.60 28.2 29 
Source: Calculated from figures in Revenue Canada, Taxation Statistics 1990: 1988 Tax Year (1990) 
table 2. 
above this level, however, the average rate at which charitable contributions were 
credited differed very little from that rate that would have resulted from a deduction at 
the federal marginal tax rate, which at the time was 17 per cent on income up to $27 500, 
                                                
100 Calculated as the aggregate of charitable donations reported by taxfilers in the income category, divided 
by the number of taxfilers in the income category claiming the charitable donations credit. 
101 Calculated as the aggregate value of tax credits received by taxfilers in the income category divided by 
the number of taxfilers in the income category claiming the charitable donations credit. 
102 Calculated as the aggregate value of tax credits received by taxfilerstax filers in the income category 
divided by the aggregate value of charitable donations reported by taxfilers in the income category. 
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26 per cent on income from $27 500 to $55 000, and 29 per cent on income exceeding 
$55 000. 
With an additional incentive for low-income taxpayers to contribute to charitable 
organisations, one might have expected to see an increase in the average amount and/or 
frequency of charitable contributions among this income group. As Table 2 indicates, 
although the average amount contributed by donors with incomes less than $50 000 
increased from 1987 to 1988, the percentage of tax filers with incomes less than $50 000 
who claimed the credit decreased. More significantly, for taxpayers with incomes greater 
than $50 000, both the average amount donated as well as the percentage of taxfilers 
 
Table 2 
Average Donation and Donation Frequency by Income Class 
(1987 and 1988) 
Income Class ($) Average Donation for Taxfilers 
Claiming Donations ($) 
Percentage of Taxfilers in Income Class 
Claiming Credit (%) 
 1987 1988 1987 1988 
1–25 000 317 333 18.9 17.7 
25 000–50 000 416 453 50.0 47.8 
50 000–100 000 801 773 69.2 66.8 
100 000–250 000 2362 2100 76.7 73.7 
Over 250 000 11 866 9542 79.4 73.8 
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Source: Calculated from figures in Revenue Canada, Taxation Statistics 1989–90: 1987–88 Tax Years 
(1989–90) table 2. 
 
claiming charitable gifts decreased noticeably.103 Overall, however, aggregate donations 
claimed by taxpayers increased substantially from 1987 to 1988, growing by 16.3 
per cent from $2.27 billion in 1987 to $2.64 billion in 1988.104 
As a result, as might have been expected from a measure that replaced an income-related 
deduction with a credit based on amounts donated, the reform appears to have shifted the 
distribution of charitable giving — and tax incentives associated with these gifts — from 
higher-income donors to lower-income donors. As Table 3 indicates, this pattern endured 
until the mid-1990s, as average donations continued to increase among lower-income 
groups, while average donations among higher-income groups continued to decline 
before eventually recovering to 1987 levels only by 1996. 
 
 
                                                
103 Although other factors undoubtedly contributed to these results, the most significant of which was a 
reduction in the top marginal rate of federal income tax from 34 per cent to 29%, per cent, which increased 
the price of charitable giving for high-income taxpayers. Since the top marginal rate of 34% per cent 
applied to income exceeding approximately $65 000, the reduction of this rate to 29 per cent and the 
conversion of the deduction to a credit with a maximum rate of 29 per cent significantly increased the price 
of charitable giving for taxpayers with incomes above this amount.  
104 Calculated from figures in Revenue Canada, Taxation Statistics 1989–90: 1987–88 Tax Years (1989–90) 
table 2. 
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Table 3 
Average Donation by Income Class 
(1989 to 1996) 
Income Class ($) Average Donation for Taxfilers Claiming Donations ($) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
1–25 000 345 345 362 371 392 387 415 425 
25 000–50 000 455 472 480 485 501 498 531 552 
50 000–100 000 779 752 749 758 754 739 763 833 
100 000–250 000 2047 2108 2100 2068 2100 1741 2040 2271 
Over 250 000 9688 9535 10324 9317 8717 8026 10 378 12 728 
Source: Calculated from figures in Revenue Canada, Taxation Statistics 1991–98: 1989–96 Tax Years 
(1991–98) table 2. 
During this period, aggregate donations claimed by taxpayers continued to increase — 
rising from $2.93 billion in 1989 to $4.12 billion in 1996, an average annual increase of 
approximately 5 per cent — despite little growth during the economic downturn of the 
early 1990s.105 
At the same time, however, as Table 4 demonstrates, the percentage of donors in all 
income classes but the highest continued to decline during this period. It is not clear what 
                                                
105 Calculated from figures in Revenue Canada, Taxation Statistics 1991–98: 1989–96 Tax Years (1991–98) 
table 2. 
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precipitated this general decline, but there is no evidence that the switch from a deduction 
to a credit was  a cause. 
Table 4 
Frequency of Donations by Income Class 
(1989 to 1996) 
Income Class ($) Percentage of Taxfilers in Income Class Claiming Donations (%) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
1–25 000 17.7 17.7 17.5 16.0 15.5 14.1 14.3 14.0 
25 000–50 000 46.4 46.5 45.8 44.7 43.1 41.3 41.6 42.8 
50 000–100 000 65.2 65.2 65.2 65.2 63.6 59.1 60.1 59.6 
100 000–250 000 73.5 74.8 73.7 75.1 73.7 67.1 73.0 72.5 
Over 250 000 75.6 76.3 77.1 76.4 75.2 72.1 75.6 77.2 
Source: Calculated from figures in Revenue Canada, Taxation Statistics 1991–98: 1989–96 Tax Years 
(1991–98) table 2. 
Capital Gains Exemptions on Gifts of  Property and Increased Income-Related 
Ceilings 
While the conversion of the charitable deduction into a credit increased average 
donations by lower-income groups and decreased average donations among higher-
income groups, more recent amendments have reversed the trend by exempting gains on 
gifts of property and increasing income-related ceilings on the percentage of a taxpayer’s 
income that can be sheltered by the charitable credit. 
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Gifts of property became taxable in Canada in 1972, when the federal government 
introduced a tax on capital gains, which were not included in the concept of income that 
Canada inherited from the United Kingdom. Following the recommendation of the Royal 
Commission on Taxation, the new rules applied to accrued gains on the transfer of capital 
property, which are deemed to have been disposed of for proceeds equal to fair market 
value.106 As a result, it followed that a taxpayer donating property to a charity could 
claim the full value of the property in computing the amount of the charitable deduction 
(and later credit) but would have to pay tax on the capital gain resulting from its 
disposition. 
Before the new rules were enacted, concerns were expressed about imposing a tax on 
gifts of property to charities.107 According to House of Commons and Senate Committees 
examining the proposed legislation, gifts of property to charities should not be subject to 
tax as a capital gain but should be deductible only to the extent of their cost to the donor, 
not their market value at the time of the gift.108 Although the federal government initially 
rejected these proposals, the ITA was amended in 1972, shortly after the new rules came 
into effect, to allow taxpayers making gifts of property to elect any amount between the 
cost of the property and its fair market value at the time of the gift, which would apply 
                                                
106 ITA ss 69(1)(b) (which applies to gifts inter vivos), 70(5) (which applies to capital property transferred 
at death). 
107 See the discussion in Bird and Bucovetsky, above n 39, 23–8. 
108See ibid 25. 
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both to determine the amount of any capital gain recognised for tax and the amount 
deductible as a charitable contribution.109 
While this amendment was consistent with the recommendations of the Commons and 
Senate Committees, it did not go as far as others, most notably representatives from 
private museums, recommended. Emphasising the need to compete for donations with 
museums in the United States, these representatives suggested that gifts of property 
should be non-taxable and fully deductible based on their fair market value at the time of 
the gift, as was the case (and continues to be the case) in the United States.110 On this 
basis, the ITA was amended in 1977 to exempt from capital gains tax any gain on a gift to 
designated institutions of ‘cultural property’ certified under the Cultural Property Export 
and Import Act.111 
Notwithstanding considerable criticism of this approach in the United States,112 more 
recent amendments have expanded on this rule by introducing further exemptions for 
gifts of property. In 1997, the ITA was amended to reduce the amount included in respect 
                                                
109 See former s 110(2.2), added by SC 1973–74, c 14, s 35(7). This rule is now s 118.1(6) of the ITA. 
110 See Bird and Bucovetsky, above n 39, 24–5. 
111 See ITA s 39(1)(a)(i.1), inserted by SC 1974–75–76, c 50, s 48, proclaimed in force from 6 September 
1977. 
112 See, eg, Andrews, above n 21, 372 (explaining that this approach is arbitrary and inequitable since ‘[t]he 
magnitude of the subsidy is a function of the amount of unrealized appreciation in relation to the basis of 
the property and the taxpayer’s rates of tax, being the greatest for taxpayers in highest brackets and with the 
most appreciation’); and Goode, above n 17, 167 (observing that this approach ‘tempts some donors to 
place excessive values on their gifts, occasionally with the collusion of recipient institutions’). For a more 
recent critique, see Colinvaux, ‘Charitable Contributions of Property’, above n 83. 
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of gains on gifts of publicly-traded securities to half of the amount that would otherwise 
be included.113 According to the federal budget announcing this partial exemption, it was 
introduced to ‘provide a level of tax assistance for donations of eligible capital property 
that is comparable to that in the US’114 in order to ‘facilitate the transfer of capital 
property to charities to help them respond to the needs of Canadians.’115 A similar rule 
was enacted for gifts of ecologically-sensitive land in 2001,116 and gifts of both types of 
property were made fully exempt in 2006.117 Most recently, some have suggested that  
this treatment should be extended to gifts of real estate and private corporation shares,118 
and the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance recently recommended that 
‘the federal government explore the feasibility and cost of eliminating or lowering the 
                                                
113 ITA s 38(a.1), inserted by SC 1998, c 19, s 6, applicable to gifts made after 18 February 1997. For 
critical assessments of this incentive, see Lisa Philipps, ‘Thinking Critically about the Taxation of Capital 
Gains on Donated Public Securities (or Looking Paragraph 38(a.1) in the Mouth)’ (2003) 51 Canadian Tax 
Journal 913; David G Duff, ‘Special Federal Tax Assistance for Charitable Donations of Publicly Traded 
Securities: A Tax Expenditure Analysis’ (2003) 51 Canadian Tax Journal 925. 
114  Department of Finance (Canada), Tax Measures: Supplementary Information (1997). Although 
donations of property are fully exempt from capital gains tax in the US, the Canadian Department of 
Finance explains that a 3/8 inclusion produces a comparable level of tax assistance in Canada due to the 
fact that the top marginal rate of tax in Canada is greater than that in the US, resulting in a lower tax price 
of donations in Canada than in the US. 
115 Ibid. 
116 ITA s 38(a.2), inserted by SC 2001, c 17, s 22(3), applicable to gifts made after 27 February 2000. 
117 SC 2006, c 4, s 51(1), amending ITA s 38(a.2), applicable to gifts made after 1 May 2006; SC 2006, 
c 28, s 4(3), amending ITA s 38(a.1), applicable to gifts made after 1 May 2006. 
118 See, eg, Malcolm Burrows, ‘Unlocking More Wealth: How to Improve Federal Tax Policy for Canadian 
Charities’ (e-Brief, C D Howe Institute, 15 September 2009). 
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capital gains tax on charitable donations of real or immovable property or the shares of 
private corporations to charities.’119  
In addition to these measures, other amendments have eliminated any income-related 
ceiling on creditable gifts of ecologically-sensitive land,120 and increased income-related 
ceilings on creditable gifts of other kinds of property from 20 per cent to 75 per cent,121 
and to 100 per cent of taxable capital gains resulting from gifts capital property.122 In 
each case, these amendments were designed to ‘encourage larger donations to charitable 
organizations’.123 
As Malcolm Burrows explains, these measures reflect a shift in Canadian policy 
regarding tax incentives for charitable contributions away from efforts to increase the 
number and amount of modest gifts paid out of ordinary income toward measures 
designed to encourage substantial donations of  property.124 Although the reasons for this 
shift are not entirely clear, they presumably include the view that gifts of capital assets 
                                                
119 House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Parliament of Canada, Tax Incentives for 
Charitable Giving in Canada (2013) 25. 
120 ITA s 118.1(1) (definition of ‘total gifts’ para (d)), as amended by SC 1997, c 25, s 26(1). 
121 ITA s 118.1(1) (definition of ‘total gifts’ para (a)(iii)), as amended by SC 1997, c 25, s 26, applicable 
after 1995, and SC 1998, c 19, s 22(14), applicable after 1996. 
122 ITA s 118.1(1) (definition of ‘total gifts’ para (a)(iii)), as amended by SC 1998, c 19, s 22(14), 
applicable after 1997. 
123  Department of Finance (Canada), Tax Measures: Supplementary Information (1996). See also 
Department of Finance (Canada), Tax Measures: Supplementary Information (1997), suggesting that the 
increased ceiling would ‘encourage more donations by providing an enhanced ability to claim tax 
assistance in the year of donation for the most generous donors.’  
124 Burrows, ‘Charitable Tax Incentives in Canada’, above n 9. 
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are more price elastic than gifts out of ordinary income, justifying an additional incentive 
as a cost-effective way to finance the charitable sector in an era of government restraint. 
Although the extent to which these measures have increased the aggregate amount of 
charitable giving, as opposed to altering its form, is not entirely clear, aggregate 
donations claimed by taxpayers increased substantially following these reforms, from 
$4.12 billion in 1996 to $5.7 billion in 2001 and $9.5 billion in 2007 — representing an 
average annual increase during these years of almost 8 per cent — before the global 
financial crisis caused donations to decline in 2008. 125  While positive economic 
circumstances during this period were probably the most significant contributor to these 
increases, higher ceilings and exemptions for gifts of property may also have played a 
part. 
As with the shift from a deduction to a credit in 1988, these measures also affected the 
distribution of charitable donations by income class, but in a way that favoured charitable 
donations by high-income taxpayers but not low- and middle-income taxpayers. As Table 
5 illustrates, before the global financial crisis caused average donations by all income 
classes to decline in 2008, average donations by donors earning less than $25 000 
increased only slightly from 2001 to 2007 while average donations by donors earning 
over $250 000 increased during these years from $14 474 to $18 631. 
                                                
125 Calculated from figures in Canada Revenue Agency, Income Statistics and GST/HST Statistics: 2001–08 
Tax Years, table 2 <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/gncy/stts/t1fnl-eng.html>. 
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Table 5 
Average Donation by Income Class 
(2001 to 2008) 
Income Class ($) Average Donation for Taxfilers Claiming Donations ($) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
1–25 000 496 499 527 544 547 537 543 532 
25 000–50 000 703 752 807 853 894 905 887 866 
50 000–100 000 938 1012 1134 1139 1276 1354 1301 1217 
100 000–250 000 2230 2473 2714 2475 2644 2729 2607 2366 
Over 250 000 14 474 15 053 16 432 16 257 16 792 18 185 18 631 16 844 
Source: Calculated from figures in Canada Revenue Agency, Income Statistics and GST/HST Statistics: 
2001–08 Tax Years (2003–10) table 2 <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/gncy/stts/t1fnl-eng.html>. 
As Table 6 further demonstrates, higher ceilings and the exemption of capital gains on 
gifts of ecologically-sensitive land and publicly-traded shares also appear to have resulted 
in only a modest  reduction on the percentage of high-income taxpayers claiming the 
charitable contributions credit, which continued to decline for all other income classes. 
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Table 6 
Frequency of Donations by Income Class 
(2001 to 2008) 
Income Class ($) Percentage of Taxfilers in Income Class Claiming Donations (%) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
1–25 000 11.8 11.1 10.6 10.4 9.8 8.6 7.2 6.9 
25 000–50 000 34.6 32.9 32.6 33.6 32.7 32.1 30.0 29.2 
50 000–100 000 51.2 50.3 49.2 50.2 49.3 47.3 44.9 44.2 
100 000–250 000 66.6 62.8 66.1 67.1 66.0 62.8 61.3 59.5 
Over 250 000 75.1 75.0 76.6 77.3 76.6 74.4 73.6 73.3 
Source: Calculated from figures in Canada Revenue Agency, Income Statistics and GST/HST Statistics: 
2001–08 Tax Years (2003–10) table 2 <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/gncy/stts/t1fnl-eng.html>. 
Finally, as Table 7 indicates, the share of charitable donations made and charitable tax 
credits obtained by low- and middle-income groups declined sharply from 1996 to 2007, 
while those of the highest income groups increased significantly during this period. 
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Table 7 
Shares of Charitable Donations and Charitable Tax Credits by Income Class 
(1996 and 2007) 
 1996 2007 
Income Class ($) Share of 
Charitable 
Donations (%) 
Share of 
Charitable Tax 
Credits (%) 
Share of Charitable 
Donations (%) 
Share of 
Charitable Tax 
Credits (%) 
1–25 000 17.0 16.1 4.4 4.0 
25 000–50 000 32.5 32.0 19.5 18.8 
50 000–100 000 26.5 26.5 29.7 29.4 
100 000–250 000 11.3 11.8 19.0 19.2 
Over 250 000 12.7 13.6 27.4 28.5 
Source: Calculated from figures in Revenue Canada, Taxation Statistics 1998: 1996 Taxation Year (1998) 
table 2; Canada Revenue Agency, Income Statistics and GST/HST Statistics: 2008 Tax Year (2010) table 2 
<http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/gncy/stts/t1fnl-eng.html>. 
Although many factors undoubtedly account for these changes, including increases in the 
concentration of income and wealth over the last two decades, expanded exemptions for 
gifts of  property and higher income-related ceilings on creditable contributions have also 
played a significant part. As a result, as Table 8 illustrates, the percentage of charitable 
contributions made and charitable credits obtained by donors with incomes exceeding 
$250 000 is significantly larger than their percentage of all taxfilers, donors and even 
taxable income, while the inverse is the case for donors with incomes less than $50 000. 
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Table 8 
Shares of Taxfilers, Donors, Taxable Income, Donations and Credits by Income Class 
(2007) 
Income Class ($) Share of 
Taxfilers 
(%) 
Share of 
Donors (%) 
Share of 
Taxable Income 
(%) 
Share of 
Charitable 
Donations (%) 
Share of 
Charitable Tax 
Credits (%) 
1–25 000 43.5 13.1 14.4 4.4 4.0 
25 000–50 000 28.4 35.7 17.6 19.5 18.8 
50 000–100 000 19.6 37.0 37.4 29.7 29.4 
100 000–250 000 4.6 11.8 17.3 19.0 19.2 
Over 250 000 0.77 2.38 13.3 27.4 28.5 
Source: Calculated from figures in Canada Revenue Agency, Income Statistics and GST/HST Statistics: 
2008 Tax Year (2010) table 2 <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/gncy/stts/t1fnl-eng.html>. 
Conclusion 
Experience in Canada over the past 25 years illustrates the pursuit of two very different 
approaches to the encouragement of charitable gifts: (1) the replacement of a deduction 
with a credit, which was intended to ‘increase fairness by basing tax assistance on the 
amount given, regardless of the income level of the donor’; and (2) the introduction of 
capital gains exemptions on gifts of property and increased income-related ceilings on 
creditable donations which are intended to ‘encourage larger donations to charitable 
organizations’. While the survey of theoretical literature in this chapter explains the 
rationales for these different approaches, the empirical analysis demonstrates the effects 
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of these different approaches on aggregate charitable donations and on the distribution of 
donations and tax benefits among different income classes. 
Given my conclusions above about the rationale for tax-assisted charitable giving, it is 
not surprising that I generally support the 1988 reform that converted the charitable 
deduction to a credit, but am troubled by more recent reforms introducing capital gains 
exemptions for gifts of property and increasing income-related ceilings on creditable 
donations. While the former resulted in a more equitable distribution of charitable 
donations and charitable tax credits, encouraging a more diverse and pluralistic charitable 
sector, the latter has accentuated a trend toward philanthropic ‘paternalism’ in which 
charitable organisations increasingly come to depend on a small number of extremely 
affluent donors to support their activities. At the same time, increases in income-related 
ceilings may allow these donors to effectively opt out of paying most income taxes by 
making charitable donations that shelter other income from tax, potentially undermining 
support for the public sector and the tax system more generally.126 
At the same time, it is important to recognise that none of these reforms appear to have 
addressed the greatest risk to a diverse and vibrant charitable sector resulting from a long-
term decline in the percentage of taxfilers in all income classes to report contributions to 
                                                
126  On the important role of an income-related ceiling on the deduction (or credit) of charitable 
contributions, see Peter J Wiedenbeck, ‘Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective’ (1985) 50 
Missouri Law Review 85, 115 (explaining that the existence of a maximum limit on deductible — or 
creditable — donations in any year ‘reflects a judgment … that although charitable contributions are 
important and should be encouraged, every taxpayer should bear part of the burden of supporting the 
government’). 
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charitable organisations. Financial assistance is, of course, not the only nor always the 
most valuable way to contribute to a charitable purpose. Individuals may make monetary 
and non-monetary contributions that they do not (or cannot) claim for tax purposes. 
However, apparent declines in the frequency of charitable giving documented in Tables 4 
and 6 suggest a disturbing trend which calls  for creative thinking about effective policy 
responses. Although tax policy may play a limited role in this response, one potentially 
promising initiative is a “First-time Donor’s Super Credit” announced by the Canadian 
federal government in its 2013 Budget.127 Based on proposals for a so-called ‘Stretch Tax 
Credit’ that would help renew Canada’s donor base by providing an enhanced tax credit 
for new donors128 this new credit will increase the value of the federal charitable 
donations tax credit by 25% on the first $1,000 of donations claimed by taxpayers if they 
or their spouses have not claimed the charitable contributions tax credit in any taxation 
year since 2007.129 As a result, Canada has introduced yet another charitable tax measure 
for other countries to study and evaluate. 
                                                
127 James M. Flaherty, Minister of Finance, Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity: Economic Action Plan 
2013, (March 21, 2013), 237, available at <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2013/doc/plan/budget2013-eng.pdf>. 
128  See Imagine Canada, ‘Stretch Tax Credit for Charitable Giving’ 
<http://www.imaginecanada.ca/node/221>. 
129 According to the Budget, this credit is available in respect of donations made on or after March 21, 2013 
and may be claimed only once in the 2013 or subsequent taxation year before 2018. 
